Why must one always know what one wants to do before one acts? I imagine myself going forward, doing things without the thought of bringing about a particular result: I'm standing here now and if I take three steps in one direction I will be standing somewhere else, right there. But the thought to go there is given, somehow
vorhanden. Das Gedanke ermaechtigt? Die Schritte sind nur mit dem Vorhaben da zu sein ueberhaupt veranlasst? oder nur dieses Vorhaben da zu sein, zu erleichtern? The firm intention makes the carrying out of my intentions easier, when the intention is unsure, then this carrying out is more hesitant,
erschwert. why would I do anything without an intention to do so. Can one act decisively without consciously knowing why? sich bewegen ueberhaupt? What is the power derived from conscious intentions? as opposed to unconscious ones? One can take the steps decisively with a firm conscious intention to be somewhere precise (for one reason?) and still have consciously a totally different reason to do so. Can reason be unconscious? One holds consciously a reason for doing something (such as taking three steps) but the real intention (the unconscious one) is itself unreasonable, it seems, if these three steps for example, cause me to fall off from the roof of a high building.
An act is found resonable or unresonable. after the intention is made apparent to us we are conscious of it as a resonable or unreasonable intention. As the intention of jumping off a high building shows, reason does not necessarily participate in the process which leads to the formation of an intention. reason may lead me to modify an unreasonable intention of to apperceive tendentiously in order to make the intention appear reasonable.
Consciously the reason may be a found one, a rationale for a previously formed unreasonable more or less unconssious intention, but both motives allow to proceed with the expection of a result, (which is the same for both different motives?) To be at odds with oneself means the unconscious wants to do one thing the conscious (with motives supplied by reason) another? Can reason do anything but reinforce more or less conscious intentions?
to reason cannot mean the same thing as
to will.
To will, however, may be the same thing as
to reason. the will is closely involved in a reasonable act in the latter reveals itself as more or less tendentious for the reason depends above all on what is
wahrgenommen in the process of forming intentions. The
unfreiwillig nature of this part of the process makes all resonable intentions suspect of accomodation, rationalisation.
These are thoughts which occur to me when I think of my rapport with the future, with all that is to come, has not happened yet, whether the next minute, the next day, month, year.
Zeitbewaeltigung. Our reflexes toward the gaping, openended part of our existence whose vorhandensein is only at any moment grammtically garanteed. Or is it? could there be a basis for thinking that the future exists already? something else than as a kind of projection? As we make our past by tendentioustly selecting a few of the many events which make it up, in order to justify our attitudes to the present, and anticipate our relation to the future. we play ourselves out in possible events. We dream. And since to dream is also to avoid not just something embarassing, or painful, or feared, but he consciousness of waht embarrasses, pains, is feared, then maybe, just maybe, we try to avoid our future...eyes wide shut.
This avoidance hinges on how much of what of going on are we aware of? How much is shut out? from the consciousness of them an infinite amount I should think. Gibt es
unmittelbares Wissen? In einer psychologischen Hinsicht wohl nicht.
Alle wahrnehmungen der Vergangenheit gelten in der tat als der Revisionismus schlecthin.Labels: Totmachung der Zukunft